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RECENT
DEVELOPMENT
Municipalities and the Antitrust Laws:
Home Rule Authority is Insufficient to

Ensure State Action Immunity
I.

INTRODUCTON

A large number of states have granted wide-ranging, general
authority to certain cities under statutory or constitutional home
rule provisions that are designed to provide municipalities with
sufficient power to deal effectively with local problems.' As a result
1. For representative home rule amendments, see ARiz. CONsr. art. XIH, § 2; Ihj
CONST. art. VII, § 6; MICH. CoNSa. art. VII, § 22; N.Y. CONS?. art. IX, § 2; O. CONS?. art.
XI, §§ 2-2(a); PA. CONsT. art. IX, § 2; Wis. CONsT art. XI, § 3. Since the state of Missouri
enacted the first home rule constitutional amendment in 1875, a large number of state legislatures have fashioned either constitutional or statutory home rule provisions. Commentators disagree on the precise number of states that have provided municipal authority approximating home rule. See, e.g., C. ANTmAu, 1 MUNIcPAL CORPORATION LAw § 3.00 (1982)
(31 states have home rule); Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations:Are Municipalities Exempt from Sherman Act Coverage Under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 Gao. L.J.
1547 (1977) (33 states). The confusion occurs because some of the constitutional or statutory
provisions for municipal government do not mention the term "home rule." E.g., Nav.
CoNs. art. VIII, § 8. Because the precise wording of the constitutional amendments and
statutes varies greatly from state to state, the state courts have played a major role in interpreting the extent of a munipality's home rule authority. See 1 C. ANTAu, supra, § 3.01.
See also infra notes 93, 121 & 145 and accompanying text.
One commentator has observed that municipal home rule has two important attributes.
First, home rule provisions are express grants of authority to municipalities to act in local
matters. In constitutional home rule states, a city derives its home rule authority from the
state constitution rather than from the legislature. 1 C. ArmAu, supra,§ 3.01. Many courts
have construed home rule statutes liberally, although the possibility of a narrow construction appears to be greater in a legislative than in a constitutional state. See id. §§ 3.09-.10.
Second, home rule provisions generally limit the authority of the state legislature to act in
local matters. Id. § 3.01. All state constitutions, however, reserve to the state the power to
regulate and control the disposition of matters of general or statewide concern. Id. § 3.08.
Because state courts have examined the parameters of the distinction between a "municipal
affair" and a "state concern" on an ad hoc basis, the municipal law of the states lacks uniformity on this question. One commentator has criticized judicial dependence upon that
terminologyThe labelling process can be almost a temptation to a hasty, mechanistic jurisprudence,
and there are many decisions in this area that are not defensible from either the intent
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of economic and technological developments that have heightened
local concern with economic regulations,2 several home rule
municipalities recently have adopted anticompetitive measures to3
restrain competition determined not to be in the public interest.
While these restraints on trade would appear to violate the antitrust laws," the municipalities-supported by their broad home
rule authority-have maintained that they are immune from antitrust scrutiny under the state action exemption from the antitrust
laws first articulated in Parker v. Brown in 1942. 5 A plurality of
of the framers responsible for the state constitutional home rule clause or from sound
social engineering. What is called for is an open discussion of whether the concern of
the people of the entire state is greater, in a particular instance, than the concern of
the local residents. This will certainly mean that even though certain large areas are
ordinarily labelled one or the other, sub-areas therein may call for a different decision.
Id. § 3.21, at 3-59. For a general overview of home rule authority, see id. §§ 3.00-4.00; J.
McGOLDRICK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL Homi RULE 1916-30 (1933); E. MCQUILLIN,
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 10.13-.16 (3d ed. 1979); C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW

§ 4-3 (1957). See infra notes 93, 121-25, 145 & 154 and accompanying text for discussions of
the Colorado and Ohio home rule laws.
2. See Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1188 n.1 (6th Cir.
1981) (use of solid waste as an alternative energy source), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct.
1416 (1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1036-37
(D. Colo. 1980) (improvements in cable television technology), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982); infra note 89 and accompanying text. Of course, many
home rule municipalities have long regulated such areas as sanitation, public works, and
zoning. State courts often have sustained some of these regulatory measures under the
broad grant of home rule authority despite the absence of specific legislative authorization
by the state. For a catalogue of these state court decisions, see 1 C. ANTraAu, supra note 1, §
3.13. The clearly anticompetitive nature of some recent municipal regulation, coupled with
the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the scope of the antitrust laws, apparently
have invited more challenges to municipal action in the federal courts.
3. See infra notes 88-116 and accompanying text.
4. Justice Rehnquist has asserted that most plaintiffs will challenge municipal actions
under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.
Ct. 835, 848 n.1, (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This section provides in relevant part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be iflegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
5. 317 U.S. 341 (1943); see infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the use of the term "exemption" is a "shorthand expression" for
the Court's belief that Congress did not intend state action to be within the purview of the
Sherman Act. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393 n.8 (1978)
(plurality opinion). Most cases have adopted this terminology. E.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 840 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350, 359 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975). Justice Rehnquist, however, contended recently that the Parker doctrine is a matter of preemption
under the supremacy clause rather than exemption from the Sherman Act. Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 846 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He
found the distinction between preemption and exemption to be of the utmost importance in
applying the antitrust laws to a municipality. See infra notes 129-36 & 181-84 and accompa-
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the Supreme Court in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co.,' however, held that the Sherman Act did apply to certain small Louisiana municipalities not organized pursuant to that
state's constitutional home rule provision. The Lafayette decision
encouraged those persons harmed by municipally imposed restraints upon competition to challenge the home rule cities under
the antitrust laws. These suits have raised questions about not
only the scope of the Lafayette interpretation of the Parker doctrine, but also the degree to which a federal court applying the
antitrust laws should consider state court interpretations of home
rule constitutional or statutory provisions7 and the exigencies of a
particular city's situation.8

During the past seven years, the Supreme Court has defined
and narrowed the parameters of the Parker exemption in several

decisions. Because these cases have addressed challenges to actions
taken by agents of the state9 rather than by the state legislatures
themselves, the Court has reconsidered the conflicting policies implicated in the application of the federal antitrust laws to an alleged state action. The Supreme Court has recognized that the
sweeping language of the antitrust laws embodies a strong congresnying text.
6. 435 U.S. 389 (1978); see infra notes 48-79 and accompanying text. For additional
commentary on the Parker doctrine and the Lafayette opinion, see Antitrust Symposium:
Municipal Antitrust Liability, 1980 ARiz. ST. L.J. 245; Areeda, Antitrust Immunity For
"State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HRv. L. Rlv. 435 (1981); Bangasser, Exposure of Municipal Corporationsto Liability for Violations of the Antitrust Laws: Antitrust Immunity
After the City of Lafayette Decision, 11 URBAN LAw. vii (1979); Blumstein & Calvani, State
Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical Services Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown
in ConstitutionalPerspective, 1978 DuKE L.J. 389; Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. Rv. 1 (1976); Smith, Antitrust Immunity for State Action: A FunctionalApproach, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 263 (1979); Comment,
Municipal Antitrust Liability: Applying City of Lafayette v. LouisianaPower & Light Co.,
31 BAYLOR L. Rzv. 563 (1979); Note, The Antitrust Liability of Municipalities Under the
Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REv. 368 (1977); Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to
Municipal Activities, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 518 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Application of
Antitrust Laws]; Note, supra note 1; Note, Whither Municipal Antitrust Liability After
Lafayette?, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 89 (1979); Note, City of Lafayette, Louisiana v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.: Will Municipal Antitrust Liability Doom Effective State-Local
Government Relations?,36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 129 (1979); 49 Mitss. L.J. 725 (1978); 1979
Wis. L. REv. 570.
7. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text; infra notes 93, 96-97 & 121.
8. See infra notes 88-118 and 142-44 and accompanying text.
9. The only private party to claim the Parker exemption in a recent Supreme Court
case was the defendant utility in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). The
defendant in that case asserted the challenged action was exempt from the Sherman Act
because the state public service commission had approved the action as part of a proposed
rate package. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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sional policy to promote free markets and competition, 10 but the
Parker decision evidenced a judicial deference for the authority of
the states to impose economic regulation in areas not delegated to
the federal government under the Constitution.1 1 Nevertheless,
when an agent of the state has acted to displace competition pursuant to general statutory or constitutional authority, the Supreme
Court has refused to extend the Parker state action exemption
without first inquiring into the scope of the state authorization of
the challenged regulation. 2
In Lafayette a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the
antitrust laws applied to municipalities "in the absence of evidence
that the State authorized or directed a given municipality to act as
it did." I s Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have considered the

Lafayette standard,

4

but the Court's holding that the statutory

authorization in Lafayette was insufficient to invoke Parkerimmunity raised serious doubts about the permissible limits of economic
regulation by municipalities. The Lafayette opinion, however, did

not explicitly sound the death knell for efforts by all municipalities
to displace competition with economic regulation since only a plurality of justices supported the rationale for denying antitrust immunity to the municipalities. 5 Moreover, the State of Louisiana
10. In United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), the Supreme Court
stated the philosophical foundation of the antitrust laws:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter
how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and
ingenuity, whatever economic muscle it can muster.
Id. at 610; see California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
106 (1980); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398-400 (1978)
(plurality opinion).
11. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
434 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977).
12. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978) ("If
municipalities were free to make economic choices counseled solely by their own parochial
interests and without regard to their anticompetitive effects, a serious chink in the armor of
antitrust protection would be introduced at odds with the comprehensive national policy
Congress established.").
13. Id. at 414 (plurality opinion).
14. See infra notes 80-87 & 109-36 and accompanying text.
15. Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan in his plurality
opinion. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall and Chief Justice
Burger joined in the result but expressed different rationales in separate concurring opinions. See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion. See infra notes 67-79 and accompany-
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had not vested the cities in Lafayette with home rule authority.16
Most states, including Louisiana, have vested their larger cities with broad grants of home rule authority. 17 In these states,
therefore, a home rule municipality's power to oversee local economic issues depends upon whether its home rule authority meets
the Lafayette standard of state authorization. In three lower federal court decisions, a municipality's authority to restrain trade
pursuant to a home rule constitutional provision was a significant
if not determinative factor in those courts' extensions of antitrust
immunity to the cities.18 The Supreme Court, however, in reversing
one of these decisions, recently held in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder"9 that the home rule amendment to
the Colorado Constitution alone did not provide sufficient authorization for a municipality to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act. 0
This Recent Development first considers the evolution of the
Parker doctrine in a variety of contexts-with special attention to
the Supreme Court's decision in Lafayette and the Court's ratioing text. Justice Blackmun also filed a brief separate dissent pertaining to a portion of

Justice Stewart's opinion with which

he did not join. See infra note 79 and accompanying

text.
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17. A number of home rule provisions extend home rule authority only to those cities
with a prescribed minimum population. E.g., Amiz. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 2 (3500); COLO.
CONST. art. XX, § 6 (2000); ILL. CONsT. art. VII, § 6(a) (25,000); NEB. CONST. art. XI, § 2
(5000); TEx. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (5000). While other states provide any city with home rule
authority, many still require a minimum population to frame a city charter. E.g., MAss.
CONST. amend. art. II, § 2 (12,000); OKLA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3(a) (2000); WASH. CONST.
art. XI, § 10 (20,000); W. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 39(a) (2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 62.06(1)
(West 1957) (1500). See Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10
WM. & MARY L. REV. 269,278 (1968).
18. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated
and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 1416 (1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982); Pueblo Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City
of Pueblo, 498 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1980); see infra notes 88-100 & 109-16 and accompanying text; infra notes 93 & 96.
19. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982), rev'g 620 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.), rev'g 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D.
Colo. 1980). In an article published prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Boulder, Professor Areeda posited three reasons why a home rule provision should give sufficient state
authorization to satisfy the Parker exemption. First, he maintained that because a court
frequently infers the requisite state intent when "reasonable" governmental action is anticompetitive, failure to do so in a home rule situation with an equally reasonable restraint
on trade would be anomalous. Second, a state often will not enact specific legislation on
every aspect of a project authorized by the legislature. Last, the presence of home rule authority is a matter of state constitutional law and "denotes a conscious state decision to
decentralize." AREEDA, supra note 6, at 448-49.
20. See infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
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nale in Boulder. After discussing the recent lower federal court decisions that based the availability of the Parker exemption upon
the existence of general home rule authority under the respective
state's constitution, this Recent Development examines the
problems posed by the Boulder decision for cities and states contemplating economic regulation tailored to particular local concerns. This Recent Development then analyzes the competing policy interests in the question of a home rule municipality's liability
under the antitrust laws. In light of the Court's decision in Boulder
to reject home rule authority as sufficient state authorization for
an application of the Parker doctrine, this Recent Development
concludes that the Supreme Court's approach in Boulder will be
least burdensome for home rule municipalities if the Court utilizes
a preemption rationale under the supremacy clause to avoid subjecting these cities to liability for treble damages under the antitrust laws.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court in Parker held that a state-sponsored agricultural program which restricted the production of raisins and
restrained competition among raisin producers did not violate the
Sherman Act.2 1 By controlling the distribution of the raisin crop,
the State of California had sought to regulate prices and thereby
"conserve the agricultural wealth of the state" and "prevent economic waste in the marketing of agricultural products."' The
Court assumed that the program would have violated the antitrust
laws if it had been instituted by private persons,'3 but found
"nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.' 2 4 The
21. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 352. Under the terms of the California Agricultural
Prorate Act, a group of agricultural producers can petition the Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission to establish a prorate zone in which all producers of a given commodity
must follow the marketing and distribution procedures of the Act. For a discussion of the
mechanics of the challenged program, see id. at 344-50. Although individual producers proposed both the establishment of a prorate zone and the proration program under the California scheme, the Supreme Court found that the state's adoption and enforcement of the
proposal constituted state action. Id. at 352.
22. Id. at 346. At the time of the Parkerdecision, raisin producers in the challenged
proration zone provided almost all of the raisins consumed in the United States and about
half of the world crop. Id. at 345.
23. Id. at 350.
24. Id. at 350-51. The Court observed,
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's legislative
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Parker Court emphasized that even though a "state or its municipality" was not participating in a private action to restrain trade, 5
"an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers
and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress. "26 Thus,
Parker established clearly that direct action by a state legislature
is exempt from the antitrust laws.
A.

The Evolution of the State Action Exemption

Twenty-nine years after Parker the Court considered a different form of state action in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.7 The
petitioners in Goldfarb challenged the Virginia State Bar Association's enforcement of a minimum fee schedule published by the
Fairfax County Bar Association.2 " The state bar was the administrative agency through which the Supreme Court of Appeals regulated the practice of law in Virginia. 9 Concluding that the minimum fee schedule was "a classic illustration of price fixing," s the
history. The sponsor of the bill which was ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act declared that it prevented only "business combinations." That its purpose was to suppress combinations to restrain competition and attempts to monopolize by individuals
and corporations, abundantly appears from its legislative history.
Id. at 351 (citing 21 CONG. Rsc. 2457, 2562 (1890)).
25. Id. at 351-52.
26. Id. at 351.
27. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
28. The petitioners in Goldfarb were a husband and wife seeking an attorney to perform a required title search for a home they wished to purchase. Unable to find a member of
the Virginia State Bar who would examine the title for less than the minimum fee prescribed in the schedule, petitioners brought this action under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at
775-78.
29. Id. at 776. A Virginia statute established the authority of the Virginia Supreme
Court to promulgate rules and maintain the state bar. The current version of the pertinent
Virginia statute provides as follows:
The Supreme Court may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend
rules and regulations organizing and governing the association known as the Virginia
State Bar, composed of the attorneys-at-law of this State, to act as an administrative
agency of the Court for the purpose of investigating and reporting the violation of such
rules and regulations as are adopted by the Court under this article for such proceedings as may be necessary, and requiring all persons practicing law in this State to be
members thereof in good standing.
VA. CODE § 54-49 (1978).
30. 421 U.S. at 783. Acknowledging the "inherent power" of the Virginia Supreme
Court "to regulate the practice of law in that State," id. at 789 n.18, the Court quoted from
a Virginia Supreme Court rule adopted in 1938:
In determining the customary charges of the Bar for similar services, it is proper for a
lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by a Bar Association, but no
lawyer should permit himself to be controlled thereby or to follow it as his sole guide
in determining the amount of his fee.
Id. at 789 n.19 (quoting RULES FOR INTEGRATION OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR, 171 Va. xvii,
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United States Supreme Court held that the relevant Virginia statute did not indicate that the "anticompetitive activities [were]
compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign."31 Therefore, the Court found the Parker exemption inapplicable to the
challenged regulations.
Goldfarb ushered in a series of important decisions concerning
the applicability of the antitrust laws to actions initiated by agents
and agencies of a state pursuant to general statutory authorization.
The only respondent in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.3 2 was a pri-

vate utility, but the challenged action-the utility's furnishing of
light bulbs to its residential customers-was part of a rate structure that the Michigan Public Service Commission had approved.ss
The Supreme Court held that since neither the state nor "any of
its officials or agents" were parties to the suit, the Parker exemption was unavailable to the utility.u
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 5 the state bar charged the
appellants" with violating a state supreme court disciplinary rule
barring advertising by attorneys.3 7 Although the United States Supreme Court held that the rule violated the protection afforded
xviii (1938)), (U.S. Supreme Court's emphasis). Virginia adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970. 211 Va. 295 (1970).
31. 421 U.S. at 791. The Third Circuit applied the Goldfarb compulsion standard in
Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975). Holding that Pittsburgh municipal
corporations violated the antitrust laws by refusing to sell the plaintiffs' malt beverages in
certain municipal facilities, the court found no state statute compelling such action. Id. at
1279-80. The failure of later cases to carry forward the Goldfarb compulsion language indicates a retreat from that rigid rule. The Supreme Court now appears to require only authorization from and not compulsion by the state legislation. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
32.' 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
33. Id. at 583. The respondent instituted its light bulb program in 1886, 23 years
before the State of Michigan started regulating electric utilities. In 1964, the Michigan Public Service Commission approved the cessation of the program for large commercial customers as part of a reduction in rates for these customers. Id.
34. Id. at 591-92.
35. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
36. The appellants in Bates were attorneys licensed by the Arizona State Bar. Id. at
353.
37. The State Bar charged the appellants with violating Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B),
which has since been amended. The disciplinary rule provided in relevant part as follows:
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city or
telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or
permit others to do so in his behalf.
433 U.S. at 355. The remainder of part (B) of the rule contained exceptions to the prohibition, none of which applied in Bates. See id. at 355 n.5.
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commercial speech under the first amendment,38 the Court determined that the regulation was not subject to attack under the
Sherman Act.3 9 The Court distinguished Goldfarb on two bases: (1)

the challenged minimum fee schedule clearly constituted "price
fixing";4 0 and (2) the Virginia statute did not explicitly authorize
the Virginia Supreme Court to adopt the fee schedule.4 1 The Su-

preme Court in Bates, on the other hand, in its holding that the
constitution specifically authorized and directed the Arizona court
to enact the disciplinary rule, 2 relied upon a state constitutional
provision establishing the Arizona Supreme Court as "the ultimate
body wielding the State's power over the practice of law.

43

Distin-

guishing Cantor, the Court noted that the petitioner in that case
filed suit against a private party rather than against the state or its
agent. 4 In addition, the Court in Bates observed that the State of
Michigan had no independent, recognizable interest in regulating
the market for light bulbs.45 The Bates Court concluded that the
38. Id. at 384.
39. Id. at 363.
40. Id. at 359; see supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
41. 433 U.S. at 359.
42. Id. at 362. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Bates contained overtones of
the balancing test for state and federal interests that he advocated in his concurring opinion
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Because the majority in Usery
failed to articulate a clear means for determining when state interests outweigh interests of
the federal government in the exercise of its commerce power under the fourteenth amendment, some federal courts have applied the balancing approach that Justice Blackmun used
in casting the "swing vote" in Usery. See, e.g., Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp.,
428 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Mr. Justice Blackmun's views are particularly to be noted as limiting possible overbroad interpretations of the Court's holding.");
Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914, 915 n.2 (D.N.D. 1977); State of Colorado v.
Veterans Admin., 430 F. Supp. 551, 559 (D. Colo. 1977), aff'd, 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979);
cf. Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199, 206 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) ("Since
Justice Blackmun's concurrence was the swing vote in the ultimate holding of National
League of Cities, it is impossible to discern what test, if any, was established for analyzing
congressional exercises of power pursuant to the Commerce Clause."), afrd, 652 F.2d 59 (6th
Cir. 1981).
43. Id. at 360. Article HI of the Arizona Constitution provides as follows:
The powers of the government of the State of Arizona shall be divided into three
separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and, except as
provided in this Constitution, such departments shall be separate and distinct, and no
one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the
others.
Amz. CONST. art. H; see In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 412, 248 P. 29, 30 (1926) ("[T]here is no
more important duty, nor one whose performance is more necessary to the proper functioning of the courts, than to see that their officers are of proper mental ability and moral
character."), appeal dismissed, 275 U.S. 575 (1927).
44. 433 U.S. at 361; see supra note 9.
45. 433 U.S. at 361; see supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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effectiveness of the state's regulatory scheme in Cantor did not depend upon an exemption for the light bulb program,46 unlike the
was "at the core of the State's
challenged action in Bates, which
' 47
power to protect the public.

B. The Application of Parker to Municipalities Under
Lafayette
The Supreme Court's next major discussion of the limits of
the Parker doctrine occurred in Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co. 48 The petitioners in Lafayette, cities organized and oper-

ated under the laws of Louisiana, sought to enjoin the respondent
utility from alleged antitrust violations. 49 Although Louisiana statutes authorized the petitioner cities to construct and maintain
electric systems both within and without their city limits,50 the Lafayette plurality held that the Sherman Act nevertheless applied
to the petitioner's conduct. Observing that Congress explicitly excluded several municipal services from the antitrust laws, 51 the
plurality refuted the contention that the municipally owned utilities were interested primarily in public service.2 The plurality also
46. 433 U.s. at 361.
47. Id.
48. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
49. The petitioner cities charged the respondent utility with a variety of antitrust violations including attempts to monopolize the generation and transmission of power by
preventing the construction of competing systems, boycotts against the cities, and improper
efforts to frustrate petitioners' attempts to secure financing for generating facilities. Id. at
392 n.5. The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the petitioners' complaint and decided the
case on the basis of a counterclaim filed by the respondent utility. The respondent charged
that the petitioners engaged in numerous actions to eliminate or suppress competition, including requiring residents to purchase electricity from the petitioners as a precondition to
continued gas and water service. Id. at 392 n.6.
50. Id. at 436 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 33:621, :1326 (West 1951), §§ 33:4162-63
(West 1966)) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 397. The Court cited the explicit inclusion of public libraries within an exemption to the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b & 21a (1976). In fact, the Court
has considered a number of congressionally created antitrust exemptions. See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966) (construing antitrust exemption in Shipping Act for lawful rate-making activities); Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (construing antitrust exemption provided by Miller-Tydings Act).
52. 435 U.S. at 403. The Court stated,
[T]he economic choices made by public corporations in the conduct of their business
affairs, designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for the community constituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the broader interests of national
economic well-being than are those of private corporations acting in furtherance of the
interests of the organization and its shareholders.
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rejected the argument that the citizens of a state, "consumers dissatisfied with the service provided by the municipal utilities,"
may safeguard the public welfare through their electoral control of
government.5 4 Noting that the Sherman Act established "competition as the polestar by which all must be guided in ordering their
business affairs, 55 the plurality interpreted the Act as an indication of congressional unwillingness to subject "this fundamental
national policy to the vagaries of the political process. '" Finally,
53. Id. at 405-06.
54. Id. at 406.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Court has considered the relationship between municipal affairs and federal regulatory schemes in a variety of contexts. In concluding that the regulatory framework of the Shipping Act applied to municipal, state, and privately owned shipping terminals, the Supreme Court found that Congress must have realized that the exclusion of the
governmental operations "would have defeated the very purpose for which Congress framed
the scheme." California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585 (1944); see also Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) (state has no constitutional immunity from federal registration tax on all civil aircraft); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (Railway Labor Act
applies to state-owned railroad in interstate commerce despite statute's failure expressly to
include public employees); Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th
Cir. 1978) (definition of "employers" in Equal Pay Act includes state-operated hospitals or
their employees).
In an equal protection challenge to a county's apportionment scheme for county commissioners, however, the Supreme Court held that
it is now beyond the question that a State's political subdivisions must comply with the
Fourteenth Amendment. The actions of local government are the actions of the State.
A city, town, or county may no more deny the equal protection of the laws than it may
abridge freedom of speech, establish an official religion, arrest without probable cause,
or deny due process of law.
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1967) (emphasis in original); see also Waller v.
Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (state and municipality are the same for purposes of double jeopardy),
reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970); Saenz v. University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026,
1028 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant organization, as a part of the University of Texas at Austin,
was "outside the ambit of the Sherman Act"). But cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575
("Political subdivisions of States-counties, cities or whatever-never were and never had
been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as
subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying
out of state governmental functions."), reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 870, 871 (1964); Williams v.
Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310 (1898) (municipality is agency of the state); Barnes v. District
of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, 544 (1875) ("A municipal corporation, in the exercise of all its
duties, including those most strictly local or internal, is but a department of the State.").
In another pre-Lafayette decision, the Fourth Circuit held that the exemption created
by Parkerhas "a very limited application." City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Assoc., 562 F.2d
280, 284 (4th Cir.), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1977). The court added, "[t]he mere fact that a
body is 'a state agency for some limited purposes' does not make it an 'antitrust shield that
allows it to foster anticompetitive practices.'" Id. at 284-85 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)); see also California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S.
482 (1962) (construing § 7 of the Clayton Act (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980))).
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the plurality articulated its suspicion that municipalities might act
parochially if allowed to implement economic regulation of their
own design. ' 57 The plurality, however, agreed with the Fifth Circuit that a municipality's permissible activities should not be restricted to those actions that receive "specific detailed legislative
authorization"; rather, the municipality must only demonstrate
"'from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a
particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of.'-58
Justice Marshall's concurring opinion interpreted the Parker
doctrine as an exemption from the antitrust laws that exists only
when "the State must 'impose' the practice as 'an act of government.' " In a separate concurrence, Chief Justice Burger urged
the Court to shift its emphasis from the parties to the suit to an
examination of the character of the challenged activity. 0 The
Chief Justice observed that the "Parker decision was thus firmly
grounded on principles of federalism," ' but he saw the issue as
being "whether the Sherman Act reaches the proprietary enterprises of municipalities. '62 In the Chief Justice's view, the Supreme Court already had recognized the fundamental "difference
between a State's entrepreneurial personality and a sovereign's decision-as in Parker-to replace competition with regulation."6 "
Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger concluded that such an approach was consistent with the focus of National League of Cities
v. Usery" upon the "attributes of sovereignty." 65 Thus, by con57.

City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 408; see supra note

12.
58. Id. at 415 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431,
434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
59. Id. at 418 (Marshall, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 420 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
61. Id. at 421 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
62. Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice offered little guidance on
the scope of the "proprietary enterprises of municipalities." Id. In a footnote he stated,
I use the term "proprietary" only to focus attention on the fact that all of the parties
are in a competitive relationship such that each should be constrained, when necessary,
by the federal antitrust laws. It is highly unlikely that Congress would have meant to
impose liability only on some of these parties, when each possesses the means to thwart
federal antitrust policy.
Id. at 422 n.3; see infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
64. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Usery the Court held "that insofar as the challenged
amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted
Congress ... ." Id. at 852. The members of the Court had yet to agree upon the role of the
Usery reasoning in a determination of the applicability of the Parker doctrine. See infra
notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
65. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 423 (Burger, C.J.,
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cluding that "the running of a business enterprise is not an integral operation in the area of traditional government functions,""6
the Chief Justice concurred in the plurality's decision that the
Louisiana cities' utility operations were within the coverage of the
Sherman Act.
Writing in dissent, Justice StewartV7 criticized the plurality for
"effectively [limiting] the governmental action immunity of the
Parker case to the acts of a state legislature." 8 After examining
the legislative history of the Sherman Act6 and the Parker opinion, Justice Stewart concluded that the Court previously had
drawn "the line between private action and governmental action. ' 70 Criticizing the plurality's observation that municipalities
may not claim sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment 7 1 the dissent questioned the plurality's use of Goldfarb because the petitioners in that case were private persons.7 2 The dissent also contended that the distinction urged by the Chief Justice
was too ambiguous to provide any guidance on the scope of the
immunity doctrine.78 Noting that the states may delegate their authority as they wish,7 ' the dissent observed that this option allows
a state to delegate power to "municipalities to deal quickly and
flexibly with local problems. '7 5 The dissent also questioned the
plurality's failure to establish the requirements for a state authorization sufficient to qualify for the Parkerexemption.7 6 The normal
paucity of legislative history at the state level often interferes with
concurring) (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976)).
66. Id. at 424 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

67. Justices White and Rehnquist joined the dissent in toto, while Justice Blackmun
joined all but the portion that concerned the applicability of Parkerto joint action by the
petitioners and private parties.
68. 435 U.S. at 427 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
69. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
70.

435 U.S. at 429 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

71. Id. at 430 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 431 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see supra note 28 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart also distinguished the Goldfarb compulsion standard on the basis that Cantor
and Goldfarb held that the state legislature must compel the private action to escape the
reach of the Sherman Act. 435 U.S. at 431 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 433 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text;
infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 434 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 435 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see supra note 1.
76. Id. at 435-37 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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the determination whether a state authorized or contemplated a
restraint on trade that would otherwise violate the Sherman Act."
According to the dissent, the extension of antitrust liability to municipalities acting without specific legislative authorization will inhibit "experimentation with innovative social and economic programs" and enable the federal judiciary to engage in wide-ranging
evaluations of the reasonableness of state and local regulations."
Both Justices Stewart and Blackmun, in separate dissents, expressed concern for the potential liability that municipalities
might face under the antitrust laws.7
The Court again considered the application of the Parkerdoctrine in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.80 when it held that a California statute81 requiring
wine wholesalers to file wine price schedules with the state violated
the Sherman Act.82 The Court, relying on Lafayette, articulated
for the first time a twofold inquiry to determine whether a challenged action lies within the scope of the Parker exemption. First,
citing Lafayette, the Court ruled that the action must be "clearly
77. Id. at 437 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying note 156.
78. Id. at 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
81. The statute provides as follows:
Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and rectifier shall:
(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers for which his
resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made by the person who owns or
controls the brand.
(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale prices, if he
owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or consumers.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24866 (West 1964).
82. 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980). The California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control charged the respondent with violating the challenged statute by selling 27 cases of wine
below the price schedule of E. & J. Gallo Winery. Id. at 100.
Prior to its decision in Midcal, the Supreme Court held in New Motor Vehicle Bd. of
Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978), that the California Automobile Franchise Act
was "a system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to displace unfettered business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships." Id. at 109. The Court apparently found the state authorization to restrain trade so explicit that it summarily dismissed the contention that Parker was
inapplicable. The Act provides that an auto manufacturer must secure the authorization of
the New Motor Vehicle Board before opening or moving a new franchise into the territory of
an existing franchised dealer if the existing dealer protests the move. CAL. VEH. CODE § 3062
(West Supp. 1981). While it did not articulate any systematic analysis of the legislative
history of the Act, the Court observed that the federal government and 25 states have enacted legislation to protect new car dealers. 439 U.S. at 100-01. Eighteen states have statutes
very similar to the California Automobile Franchise Act. Id. at 102 n.7.
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articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy."' 3 The
Court found that the statute for resale price maintenance of wines
in California met this part of the Lafayette test.84 Second, the
Court determined that the action must be "actively supervised" by
the state. 85 California, however, failed to satisfy this part of the
inquiry because the state merely "authorize[d] price-setting and
enforce[d] the prices established by private parties."8 The Court
found the "gauzy cloak of state involvement" insufficient to bring
the price-setting arrangement within the purview of the newly
redefined Parker exemption.8

IH. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Since the Court first established in Parker that the Sherman
Act does not apply to a restraint on trade imposed directly by a
state, it has groped for an analytical framework to determine the
limits of the state action immunity. The two-part inquiry in Midcal set forth the criteria that a state agency must satisfy before its
anticompetitive acts fall within the scope of the Parker exemption.
The Court's earlier effort in Lafayette to apply to a municipality
the requirement that eventually became the first part of the Midcal test-whether the state explicitly authorized the restraint on
competition-however, resulted in no clear majority position. Because the petitioners in Lafayette were not acting pursuant to
home rule authority, the Court did not have occasion to consider
whether the Louisiana home rule amendment would provide the
clear state authorization to regulate competition that the enabling
statute in Lafayette lacked. With no guidance other than the divergent rationales in the separate opinions of Lafayette, several
lower courts have reached conflicting conclusions on the applicability of the Parker exemption to home rule municipalities seeking to
displace competition with regulation.
The Sixth Circuit extended the Parker exemption to a home
rule municipality in Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron.8 8
The court upheld a city ordinance requiring all garbage, collectors
83.

445 U.S. at 105.

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The Court apparently distinguished the wine program in Midcal from the agricultural proration scheme in Parker on the basis that the state did not review the price
maintenance in Midcal. Id. at 105; see supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.

87. Id. at 106.
88.

654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 1416 (1982).
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within the city and county to deposit all refuse at a new energy
recycling plant and to pay a tipping fee when they deposited the
garbage. 8 9 Without the ordinance's guarantee of a steady supply of
garbage to the plant, the underwriters for the bonds necessary to
finance the plant would have refused to underwrite the offering."
The conditions in the ordinance, however, interfered with the
plaintiff's landfill operation and the profitable business of selling
recyclables that he operated in conjunction with the landfill.' 1 Observing that Ohio courts have held that the Ohio home rule consti89. Id. at 1195. The challenged portions of the Akron ordinance read:
No person, except duly authorized collectors of the City or private haulers licensed
pursuant to law shall collect or remove any garbage, or rubbish accumulating within
the City or use the streets, avenues and alleys of the City for the purpose of collecting
or transporting the same. All licenses granted to such private haulers and all contracts
or other forms of authorization of duly authorized collectors shall require that all garbage or rubbish collected and transported under authority for disposal by the City's
energy plant, be disposed of at such plant from and after the date on which such plant
begins accepting garbage and rubbish for disposal.
Until such time as the City's recycle energy plant begins accepting rubbish for
disposal, no rubbish shall be deposited by the holder of a rubbish hauler's license
within the corporate limits of the City except at a place designated in writing by the
Mayor. From and after the date on which such plant begins accepting rubbish for disposal, all rubbish collected within the corporate limits of the City by a holder of a
rubbish hauler's license shall be deposited at such plant; provided that rubbish which
is not acceptable for disposal by such plant shall not be deposited within the City
except at a place designated in writing by the Mayor.
Id. at 1189 n.3 (quoting Akron ordinance).
90. The underwriters for the bond issue, Dillon, Reed & Co., required that the city,
county, and the Ohio Water Development Authority execute an agreement, which contained
the following provisions:
[The City of Akron] will not establish, construct, or operate nor consent to the
establishment, construction or operation of any facility for the disposal or other treatment of Solid Waste which is acceptable for disposal [at the plant] and for which the
[plant] has capacity available and which the [Water Authority] determines to be detrimental to the [plant], and, further, to the extent legally permissible, it will oppose the
establishment, construction or operation of such a facility ....
For the term of this Agreement, the [City] shall require that all collectors and
haulers of Solid Waste within the [City] be licensed by the [City] and all such licenses
shall provide that all collectors or haulers of Solid Waste shall dispose of all Solid
Waste generated within the corporate limits of the [City] which is acceptable for disposal by the [plant] to be delivered to the [plant] for disposal through the [plant] and
require that such haulers and collectors and the [City] pay or cause to be paid the fees
and charges imposed by the [City] for the disposal of Solid Wastes at the [plant]. The
[City] will take all available action, administrative, judicial and legislative, to cause all
Solid Waste generated within the corporate limits of the [City] and which is acceptable
for disposal by the project, to be delivered to the [plant] for disposal through the
[plant].
Id. at 1189 n.2.
91. Id. at 1190.
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tutional provisions "pass the sovereign power of municipal government... directly from the people of the state to the people of the
city," 2 the Sixth Circuit also noted that a state statute grants
Ohio cities authority to regulate the disposal of wastes." The court
found it difficult to apply the Lafayette decision "since the plurality and dissenting opinions [were] each supported by four justices,
and no line of reasoning command[ed] a majority of the Court.""
The Sixth Circuit distinguished Lafayette because the Louisiana
cities were competing "with others outside the boundaries of
[their] governmental authority in an area in which [they were] not
92. Id. at 1191.
93. Id. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.43 (Page 1976) reads: "Any municipal corporation
may provide for the collection and disposition of sewage, garbage, ashes, animal and vegetable refuse, dead animals, and animal offal, and may establish, maintain, and regulate plants
for the disposal thereof."
The Ohio home rule amendment reads: "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise
all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary, and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." OHIO
CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (adopted 1912).
One commentator has noted that the "unfortunate" drafting of the Ohio clause has
forced courts to distinguish between matters of "local self-government" and those areas subject to the "general laws." I C. ANwu, supra note 1, § 3.02; see also Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 215 N.E.2d 631, 641 (Ohio P. Ct. 1964). Nevertheless,
Ohio courts often have stressed the extensive authority delegated to municipalities under
the state's constitutional home rule. E.g., Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 13 Ohio St. 2d 63, 68,
233 N.E.2d 864, 868 ("[A] charter city has all powers of local self-government, except to the
extent that those powers are taken from it or limited by other provisions of the Constitution
or by statutory limitations on the powers of a municipality which the Constitution has authorized the General Assembly to impose.") (emphasis in original), appeal dismissed, 391
U.S. 601 (1968); City of Cleveland v. Raffa, 13 Ohio St. 2d 112, 113-14, 235 N.E.2d 138, 140,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 927 (1968); State ex rel. McClure v. Hagerman, 155 Ohio St. 320, 328,
98 N.E.2d 835, 837 (1951) (municipalities have full authority over municipal affairs regardless of express provisions of local charter); Billings v. Cleveland Ry., 92 Ohio St. 478, 489,
111 N.E. 155, 158 (1917) (home rule city has authority to franchise street railway). The Ohio
case law reveals the varied areas in which municipalities have authority to act. E.g., Young
v. City of Dayton, 12 Ohio St. 2d 71, 72, 232 N.E.2d 655, 656 (1967) (home rule city has
authority to convey surplus municipal property); Thompson v. City of Cincinnati, 2 Ohio St.
2d 292, 294, 208 N.E.2d 747, 749-50 (1965) (home rule city can impose an income tax); State
ex rel. Bindas v. Andrish, 165 Ohio St. 441, 445, 136 N.E.2d 43, 45 (1956) (home rule city
has power to set qualifications for city councilmen different from those prescribed by state
legislature); Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 258-59, 140 N.E. 595, 598
(1923) (home rule city can control buses traveling through the city); Froelich v. City of
Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 384-85, 124 N.E. 212, 215 (1919) (home rule city can regulate
load weights of vehicles on city streets); Massa v. City of Cincinnati, 110 N.E.2d 726, 731
(Ohio C.P.) (home rule city can dictate manner and method of street repair), appeal dismissed, 160 Ohio St. 254, 115 N.E.2d 689 (1953); City of Columbus ex rel. Falter v. Columbus Metropolitan Housing Auth., 67 N.E.2d 338, 351 (Ohio C.P.) (home rule city can require
slum clearance and provision of low-cost housing), aff'd, 68 N.E.2d 108 (Ohio Ct. App.
1946).

94. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d at 1195.
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politically accountable. '9 5 To justify its holding in light of the contradictory signals from Lafayette, the court offered three rationales for its decision. First, garbage collection and incineration are
"traditional" activities of government."6 Second, the "legal system
of the state" allows the state water authority to maintain some degree of supervision over the facility. 7 Last, the waste disposal system accords with the energy and environmental policies of the federal government.98 Recognizing the validity of the federal policy of
open markets and competition that underlies the antitrust laws,"9
the court, nevertheless, found that this federal interest should not
preempt a municipality's "plenary, governmental power to deal
with such local problems affecting the public interest."100
Just ten days before the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Ak95. Id. The Sixth Circuit had speculated that this "may turn out [to be] the narrow
holding" of Lafayette. Id.; see Glenwillow Landfill, Inc. v. City of Akron, 485 F. Supp. 671,
678 n.11 (N.D. Ohio 1979), affd sub nom. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654
F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 1416 (1982).
96. 654 F.2d at 1195. Furthermore, the case law in Ohio expressly authorizes a home
rule city to maintain a monopoly in the disposal of solid waste. See infra note 154 and
accompanying text.
97. Id. at 1195-96. OHIo Rv. CODE ANN. § 6123.03 (Page 1977) (current version at
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 6123.03 (Page 1982)) established the water development authority
to provide for the comfort, health, safety, and general welfare of all employees and
other inhabitants of the state and for the conservation of the land, air and water resources of the state through efficient and proper methods of disposal, salvage and reuse
of or recovery of resources from solid wastes .... [Tihe Ohio water development authority may initiate, acquire, construct, maintain, repair and operate solid waste
projects or cause the same to be operated pursuant to a lease, sub-lease or agreement
with any person or governmental agency ....
Id. The district court in Akron found this statutory framework sufficient to demonstrate
that the state legislature authorized the anticompetitive action by the water development
authority. Glenwillow Landfill, Inc. v. City of Akron, 485 F. Supp. at 677. The city had
approached the water authority originally about financing the project, but the agency was
unable to pay for the bonds from its funds. Id. at 688.
98. 654 F.2d at 1196. The Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection
Agency filed amicus curiae briefs for the City of Akron. Furthermore, the Akron court noted
that the city's use of refuse as an alternative energy source was consistent with the policy
underlying the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Id. at 1196 & n.5. The Act provides in relevant part as follows:
The Congress finds with respect to energy, that(1) solid waste represents a potential source of solid fuel, oil, or gas that can be
converted into energy;
(2) the need exists to develop alternative energy sources for public and private
consumption in order to reduce our dependence on such sources as petroleum products,
natural gas, nuclear and hydro-electric generation; and
(3) technology exists to produce usable energy from solid waste.
42 U.S.C. § 6901(d) (1976).
99. 654 F.2d at 1196; see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
100. 654 F.2d at 1196.
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ron, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas refused
to extend the Parker exemption to a home rule city in Affiliated
Capital Corp. v. City of Houston.101 The petitioner in Houston was
a cable television company that had failed in its bid to gain a
franchise for a portion of the lucrative Houston market.1 02 In evaluating the city's claim for immunity under the Parker doctrine,
the court traced the recent evolution of the exemption and the various interpretations of the applicable standard.103 The District
Court determined that the city could meet neither the Goldfarb
standard of compulsion by the state to displace competition,1 °4 nor
the Lafayette requirement of a legislative intent to restrain
trade.105 The court noted that the Texas constitutional provision
for home rule municipalities,10° which did not contain any limitation upon a city's power to franchise, 07 constituted a neutral ex101. 519 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1981). The court in Houston also sustained a jury
verdict that the defendants-the successful franchisee, the city, and the mayor---"had participated in a conspiracy to limit competition from non-conspirators and to limit competition among co-conspirators." Id. at 1005. Nevertheless, because the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that its failure to receive a franchise resulted from the conspiracy, id. at 1009,
the court granted the defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. The court analyzed the Parker
doctrine extensively "to demonstrate that [it] would have been inapplicable on the current
record, even if plaintiff had prevailed on the causation issue." Id. at 1012.
102. Id. at 998-99.
103. Id. at 1023-27.
104. Id. at 1026-27; see supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
105. 519 F. Supp. at 1027.
106. Tx. CONST. art. 11, § 5 provides as follows:
Cities having more than five thousand (5000) inhabitants may, by a majority vote
of the qualified voters of said city, at an election held for that purpose, adopt or amend
their charters, subject to such limitations as may be prescribed by the Legislature, and
providing that no charter or any ordinance passed under said charter shall contain any
provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of the general laws enacted
by the Legislature of this State; said cities may levy, assess and collect such taxes as
may be authorized by law or by their charters; but no tax for any purpose shall ever be
lawful for any one year, which shall exceed two and one-half per cent. of the taxable
property of such city, and no debt shall ever be created by any city, unless at the same
time provision be made to assess and collect annually a sufficient sum to pay the interest thereon and creating a sinking fund of at least two per cent. thereon; and provided
further, that no city charter shall be altered, amended or repealed oftener than every
two years.
107. The Texas Legislature has expressly provided full franchising authority to home
rule cities:
To prohibit the use of any street, alley, highway or grounds of the city by any
telegraph, telephone, electric light, street railway, interurban railway, steam railway,
gas company, or any other character of public utiltity without first obtaining the consent of the governing authorities expressed by ordinance and upon paying such compensation as may be prescribed and upon such condition as may be provided by any
such ordinance. To determine, fix and regulate the charges, fares or rates of any person,
firm or corporation enjoying or that may enjoy the franchise or exercising any other
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pression of legislative intent by the state legislature to provide
freedom to home rule cities in the franchising process. 10 8
The Tenth Circuit held in Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder0 9 that the Parker exemption applied to an an-

ticompetitive ordinance enacted by the city pursuant to its home
rule authority. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the
impact of home rule on the availability of Parker immunity. In
Boulder the petitioning cable television company had operated a
cable television system in Boulder, Colorado, under license from
the city council since 1966.110 Because technological advances in-

creased the capabilities of cable television,"' the petitioner notified the city council in May 1979 that it intended to expand its
service area. " 2 A newly formed cable television company informed
the city council in July 1979 of its interest in operating a cable

television system in Boulder. " Based upon a study of its cable
114
television policy conducted with the aid of an outside consultant,
public privilege in said city and to prescribe the kind of service to be furnished by such
person, firm or corporation, and the manner in which it shall be rendered, and from
time to time alter or change such rules, regulations and compensation ....
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. AN. art. 1175 (12) (Vernon 1963).
108. 519 F. Supp. at 1029. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
109. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
110. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 835 (1982). In
1964 the city issued a 20 year exclusive license to a company that subsequently assigned it
to petitioner in 1966. Under the provisions of the license, petitioner maintained a cable
television service for residents of the University Hills section of Boulder who were unable to
receive broadcast television for geographical reasons. Approximately 20% of Boulder's population lived in the University Hills area. Id. at 837.
111. The district court summarized the recent developments in the cable television
industry as follows:
Up to late 1975, cable television throughout the country was concerned primarily
with retransmission of television signals to areas which did not have normal reception,
with some special local weather and news services originated by the cable operators.
During the late 1970's however, satellite technology impacted the industry and
prompted a rapid, almost geometric rise in its growth. As earth stations became less
expensive, and "Home Box Office" companies developed, the public response to cable
television greatly increased the market demand for such expanded services.
The "state of art" presently allows for more than 35 channels, including movies,
sports, FM radio, and educational, children's, and religious programming. The institutional uses for cable television are fast increasing, with technology for two-way service
capability. Future potential for cable television is referred to as "blue sky", indicating
that virtually unlimited technological improvements are still expected. Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F.Supp. 1035, 1036-37 (D. Colo.), rev'd,
630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
112. 102 S. Ct. at 837.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 837 n.6 (quoting Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
485 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D. Colo. 1980)).
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the council passed an ordinance prohibiting the petitioner from expanding its business for three months while the council drafted an
ordinance to regulate the cable television market in the city.11 5 The
council expressed its concern that any further expansion by the
petitioner might dissuade potential competitors from entering the
Boulder market."
' and conThe Supreme Court surveyed the relevant case law 17
115. 102 S. Ct. at 837-38. The preamble of the interim ordinance read in pertinent part as follows:
".. . cable television companies have within recent months displayed interest in
serving the community and have requested the City Council to grant [them] permission
to use the public right-of-way in providing that service; and
" ... the present permittee, [petitioner], has indicated that it intends to extend
its services in the near future.

.

. ; and

" ... the City Council finds that such an extension... would result in hindering
the ability of other companies to compete in the Boulder market; and
"... the City Council intends to adopt a model cable television permit ordinance,
solicit applications from interested cable television companies, evaluate such applications, and determine whether or not to grant additional permits. . . [within] 3 months,
and finds that an extension of service by [petitioner] would result in a disruption of
this application and evaluation process; and
".... . the City Council finds that placing temporary geographical limitations upon
the operations of [petitioner] would not impair the present services offered by [it] to
City of Boulder residents, and would not impair [its] ability ... to improve those services within the area presently served by it."
Id. at 838 n.7 (quoting Boulder, Colo., Ordinance 4473 (1979)).
After the Tenth Circuit's decision in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1981) (BoulderI), and the expiration of the 90 day moratorium,
the city instituted additional temporary restrictions on petitioner while the city studied its
plan. Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged these restraints prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Boulder I in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 496 F. Supp. 823
(D. Colo. 1980), rev'd, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981) (BoulderII). Because the Tenth Circuit in Boulder II relied upon its reasoning in Boulder I, this Recent Development concentrates on the rationale of the earlier decision.
116. 102 S. Ct. at 838. The district court noted that "[tihe primary thrust of [the
consultant's] advice was that the City should be concerned about the tendency of a cable
system to become a natural monopoly." Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
485 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835
(1982). At the time the Tenth Circuit considered Boulder II, two additional cable television
companies had expressed an interest in the Boulder market. BoulderII, 660 F.2d 1370, 1374
(10th Cir. 1981).
117. 102 S. Ct. at 839-43. The District Court for the District of Colorado, which had
denied the Parker exemption to the city in the Boulder cases, reached a different result in
Pueblo Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 498 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1980). In that case
the court held that the city was immune from the antitrust laws in its operation of an airport outside the city's corporate limits. Although the district court outlined carefully the
Tenth Circuit's holding in Boulder I, id. at 1209-10, and the Colorado home rule provision,
id. at 1207-08, the court appeared to base its holding primarily upon a statute that stated:
"[T]he... establishment... and operation of airports ... are hereby declared to be
public, governmental functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public
necessity; and such lands and other property, easements and privileges acquired and
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cluded that the city's action did not fall within the parameters of
Parker,unless the ordinance constituted "the action of the State
of Colorado itself in its sovereign capacity ...

[or] municipal ac-

tion in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy." 118 Rejecting the application of
the Parker doctrine by the Tenth Circuit, 1 9 the Supreme Court
held that the system of federalism embodied in the Constitution
has "no place for sovereign cities."120 The city of Boulder maintained that the home rule amendment to the Colorado Constitution was sufficient to meet the Lafayette requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expression""' of a state authorization to
used in the manner and for the purpose enumerated in this act shall and are hereby
declared to be acquired and used for public purposes and as a matter of public
necessity."
498 F. Supp. at 1207. The court found that in view of this statute, "complete sovereignty
has been granted by the Constitution to Home Rule Cities." Id. Furthermore, the express
language of the statute convinced the court that the City of Pueblo "was acting in a governmental and not in a proprietary capacity." Id.
In a case decided prior to Goldfarb, the Seventh Circuit denied a challenge that an
unsuccessful cable television applicant made to a city for granting an exclusive franchise to
another company. Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
The city had acted pursuant to an Illinois franchising statute, which provided in relevant
part: "The corporate authorities of each municipality may license, franchise and tax the
business of operating a community antenna television system as hereinafter defined." ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-42-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82). Even though the plaintiff admitted that the actions of the city council did not violate the Sherman Act, the court noted that
the law implicitly granted a city "the authority to determine whether one or more than one
applicant should be franchised." Id. at 228.
118. 102 S. Ct. at 841. The Court did not discuss the compulsion standard articulated
in Goldfarb. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 842. The Tenth Circuit held in Boulder I that Lafayette does not control
when "the governmental entity is asserting a governmental rather than proprietary interest." Boulder I, 630 F.2d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). Furthermore, the court appeared to identify the city and the state as one entity because it found
the city's ordinances and their enforcement sufficient to meet the Midcal test. Id.; see supra
notes 80-87 and accompanying text. This position undoubtedly prompted the dissent to the
Tenth Circuit's opinion in Boulder I to assert "We are a nation not of 'city-states' but of
States." Id. at 717 (Markey, C.J., dissenting) (quoted with approval in 102 S. Ct. at 842).
120. 102 S. Ct. at 842.
121. Id. The home rule amendment to the Colorado Constitution provides in relevant
part:
The people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two thousand
inhabitants ... ,are hereby vested with, and they shall always have, power to make,
amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its organic law
and extend to all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law
of the state in conflict therewith.
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of all munici-
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restrain trade. Furthermore, the city contended that the ordinance
was within the powers "granted" by the home rule provision. The
Supreme Court rejected this view,122 holding instead that "the
State's position ... of mere neutrality respecting the municipal
actions challenged as anticompetitive" did not satisfy the Lafayette requirement.1 2 The Court dismissed the theory that a general
grant of authority to enact ordinances implied a state authorization of anticompetitive practices by a municipality.1 2 4 The city arpalities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local and
municipal matters and the enumeration herein of certain powers shall not be construed
to deny such cities and towns and to the people thereof, any right or power essential or
proper to the full exercise of such right.
The statutes of the state of Colorado so far as applicable, shall continue to apply
to such cities and towns, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such cities and
towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (home rule amendment).
The Colorado home rule amendment explicitly establishes the supremacy of municipal
regulation over state law in municipal matters. Colorado courts have recognized the plenary
power of municipalities in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Security Life & Accident Co. v.
Temple, 177 Colo. 14, 16, 492 P.2d 63, 64 (1972) (state cannot preclude home rule cities
from local taxation because it is "'essential . . . to the full exercise' of the right of self
government") (quoting Colorado home rule amendment); Fladung v. City of Boulder, 165
Colo. 244, 248-49, 438 P.2d 688, 691 (1968) (state debt limit does not apply to home rule
municipalities' bond issues); Leach & Arnold Homes, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 32 Colo. App.
16, 18, 507 P.2d 476, 477 (1973) (Colorado law provides "unlimited authority to reserve to
the electors of the City of Boulder the referendum power and the manner of exercising the
same"). The courts have emphasized that the state legislature may not impair constitutionally conferred home rule authority. See, e.g., Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618
P.2d 1374, 1380-81 (Colo. 1980); Vela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 466-67, 484 P.2d 1204, 1205
(1971) (en banc); Kelly v. City of Fort Collins, 163 Colo. 520, 522-23, 431 P.2d 785, 787
(1967) (en banc); Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 294, 369 P.2d 67, 72 (1962) (en banc); City of Fort Collins v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 69 Colo. 554, 195 P. 1099, 1100 (1921). The Colorado courts, however, also
have held that matters of statewide concern are the sole province of the state legislature.
E.g., Century Elec. Serv. & Repair, Inc. v. Stone, 193 Colo. 181, 183-84, 564 P.2d 953, 955
(1977) (en banc) (licensing of electricians is statewide concern); City of Englewood v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 163 Colo. 400, 406, 431 P.2d 40, 43 (1967) (en banc) (telephone
utility is state concern); Alessi v. Municipal Court, 38 Colo. App. 153, 154, 556 P.2d 87, 8889 (1976) (state supreme court may impose rules of procedure for municipal courts).
The Tenth Circuit placed great emphasis upon the Colorado courts' construction of this
amendment, see Boulder I, 630 F.2d at 707, but the Supreme Court rejected this reliance.
See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
122. 102 S. Ct. at 843. The Boulder majority stated,
A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be said to have
"contemplated" the specific anticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is
sought. Nor can these actions be truly described as "comprehended within the powers
granted," since the term, "granted," necessarily implies an affirmative addressing of
the subject by the State. The State did not do so here ...
Id. (emphasis in original).
123. Id. (emphasis in original).
124. Id.; see infra notes 145 & 154 and accompanying text.
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gued that a denial of the Parkerexemption would have deleterious
effects upon cities, but the Court viewed that contention as merely
"an attack upon the wisdom of the longstanding congressional
commitment to the policy of free
markets and open competition
'12 5
embodied in the antitrust laws.

In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Stevens suggested
that both Boulder and Lafayette presented two separate issues: (1)
whether the Parker doctrine exempts the municipality from the
antitrust laws; and (2) whether the municipality's actions constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. According to Justice Stevens,
the majority did not hold that Boulder violated the antitrust laws,
but merely that the Sherman Act applies to Boulder despite the
city's status as a home rule municipality.126 Recommending that
the "dissent's dire predictions about the consequences of the
Court's holding. . . be viewed with skepticism, 1 27 Justice Stevens
noted that subsequent events had not substantiated a similar
12 8
warning by Justice Stewart in Cantor.

In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist 129 warned
that the majority position will "impede, if not paralyze, local governments' efforts to enact ordinances and regulations aimed at protecting public health, safety, and welfare, for fear of subjecting the
local government to liability under the Sherman Act."130 Justice
Rehnquist cited two propositions to support his charge that the
majority made two serious errors in its consideration of Boulder:
125. Id.
126. Id. at 844 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also maintained that the
Court did not hold in Lafayette that the Louisiana cities had violated the Sherman Act. Id.
He stated, "Moreover, that question is quite different from the question whether the City of
Boulder violated the Sherman Act because the character of their respective activities differs.
In both cases, the violation issue is separate and distinct from the exemption issue." Id.
127. Id.; see infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
128. Id. In his dissenting opinion in Cantor Justice Stewart stated,
The Court today holds that a public utility company, pervasively regulated by a
state utility commission, may be held liable for treble damages under the Sherman Act
for engaging in conduct which, under the requirements of its tariff, it is obligated to
perform. I respectfully dissent from this unprecedented application of the federal antitrust laws, which will surely result in disruption of the operation of every state-regulated public utility company in the Nation and in the creation of "the prospect of massive treble damage liabilities" payable ultimately by the companies' customers.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 614-15 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting
Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 693, 728 (1974)).
129. Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor joined the dissent.
130. 102 S.Ct. at 845 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's treatment of the issue of a municipality's liability for treble damages, see infra notes
170-85 and accompanying text.
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(1) that the state action questions of the Parker doctrine are more
properly questions of preemption rather than exemption; and (2)
that the majority essentially treated a subdivision of a state as "indistinguishable from any privately owned business.1 13 1 In Justice

Rehnquist's view, the majority's suggestion that a municipality actually may violate the Sherman Act 1 32-rather than merely enact a
statute that is unenforceable because the federal government has
preempted the area under the supremacy clause 33 of the Constitution-potentially will subject the municipality to great liability because of the vicissitudes of judicial interpretations of the Sherman
Act.134 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist found no distinction between cities and states under a supremacy clause analysis3 5 and
saw no reason for the majority's "startling conclusion that our Federalism is in no way implicated when a municipal ordinance is in6
validated by the Sherman Act.

'13

131. 102 S. Ct. at 845 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
134. 102 S. Ct. at 848-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's view that the
Boulder majority failed to distinguish the city from a private party is particularly significant
in light of National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), in
which the Court held that a party cannot defend a restraint upon trade on the basis that
unfettered competition threatens public safety or a profession's ethical standards. Id. at
693-94. Thus, Justice Rehnquist found that the majority's holding in Boulder, coupled with
ProfessionalEngineers, would preclude a municipality's efforts to justify a restraint upon
trade "on the basis that its benefits to the community, in terms of traditional health, safety,
and public welfare concerns, outweigh its anticompetitive effects." 102 S. Ct. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist maintained, however, that a rejection of the applicability of the Professional Engineers rationale to municipal legislation created other
difficulties:
If the Rule of Reason were "modified" to permit a municipality to defend its regulation
on the basis that its benefits to the community outweigh its anticompetitive effects, the
courts will be called upon to review social legislation in a manner reminiscent of the
Lochner era. Once again, the federal courts will be called upon to engage in the same
wide-ranging, essentially standardless inquiry into the reasonableness of local regulation that this Court has properly rejected.
Id. at 849 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
135. 102 S. Ct. at 849-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 850 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). According to Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court has failed to distinguish between states and their subdivisions when the questions concern preemption. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing City of Burbank v.
Lockhead Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
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IV. ANALYSIS

While the Supreme Court's decision in Boulder dispelled some
uncertainty about the extent of the Court's resolve to deny the
Parkerexemption to municipalities, the Court has left a number of
questions unanswered for home rule cities that must consider their
newfound vulnerability to antitrust challenges. The Supreme
Court concluded that the city of Boulder, despite its home rule
authority, failed to meet the Lafayette criterion of clear articulation and authorization by the state for an extension of Parker immunity, l 7 but the Court neglected to provide any framework-absent a specific legislative enactment from the state
legislature-for evaluating the importance of local control of municipal economic matters. For example, the Supreme Court struck
down the ordinance in Akron even though it furthered significant
public policies by regulating garbage collection.138 Similarly, the
development of cable television systems on a community-by-community basis results not only from current technological advances,
but also from the widely varying opportunities offered by certain
cities, which heighten each city's interest in regulated and controlled expansion of this medium.3 9 The limited application of
Parker immunity by Boulder, however, poses potential problems
for home rule municipalities that traditionally have developed regulatory schemes tailored to their particular needs. Because local
government has a significant interest in regulating certain activities, the Court should modify the approach in Boulder to permit
home rule cities to rely upon their constitutional authority to restrain competition without the threat of liability for treble damages. In developing a rationale for applying Parker that will accommodate local governmental interests, however, the Court also
must weigh important federal interests at stake when a home rule
municipality implements anticompetitive measures. This part of
the Recent Development first analyzes the Boulder decision and
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Lafayette, Professor
Handler argued that "the preservation of our federalism overrides whatever benefits might
flow from extending the reach of antitrust by limiting the ambit of the state action defense."
Handler, supra note 6, at 20. In the context of his discussion in support of the Parker
doctrine, Professor Handler criticized a preemption analysis as "plainly at war with the fundamental principles of American federalism." Id. at 15.
137. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
139. One author has encouraged cities to take the initiative in developing cable systems to realize the potential benefits of the medium to urban society. R. JACOBSON, MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF CABLE COMMUNICATIONS (1977).
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the problems it poses for cities like Akron, 140 and then discusses
possible rationales that the Court may utilize to determine
whether a home rule municipality denied the state action exemption under Boulder actually has violated the antitrust laws. Finally, the Recent Development concludes that the preemption
analysis advocated by Justice Rehnquist best accommodates the
competing federal and local interests at stake.
A.

The Imposition of Liability: Elevating FederalInterests
Over Local Concerns

The Boulder case presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to define the role of home rule authority in the Parker
doctrine in a factual setting in which the municipality lacked a
compelling justification for the regulation. In Boulder the Court
noted that the new cable television company that sought to enter
the local market had indicated its intention to do so regardless of
any action by the city council.142 Thus, the failure of the existing
company's intended expansion to dissuade the potential competition may have weakened significantly the city's position that an
anticompetitive ordinance was needed. The city in Akron, on the
other hand, sought to advance an important local interest-preservation of a viable central business district 14 -- as well as
an important federal policy-development of alternative energy
sources.14 4 The Boulder case also offered the Court an opportunity
to assess the significance of a broad home rule amendment. Colorado cities derive their home rule authority from the state constitution rather than from statute, and the Colorado home rule provision is one of the most expansive in existence. 45 Thus, despite the
140. See infra notes 142-62 and accompanying text. For several recent newspaper accounts of the potential impact of the Boulder decision, see Page, Iowa Survey-State warns
cities on taxi regulations, Natl Cities Weekly, Apr. 19, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Ranii, Cities'
Immunity Loss Spawning Antitrust Suits?, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 1, 1982, at 8,col. 3; Siena, Boulder decision put cities between rock and hard place, Nat'l Cities Weekly, Feb. 1, 1982, at 3,
col. 1.
141. See infra notes 163-84 and accompanying text.
142. Boulder I, 102 S. Ct. at 837 n.5.
143. One event that prompted the city of Akron to undertake the energy project was
the desire of the company supplying steam heat to downtown businesses to abandon the
Akron market. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d at 1188.
144. See supra note 98.
145. The Colorado Supreme Court has noted the extreme breadth of its state's home

rule provision: "In numerous opinions... it has been made perfectly clear that when the
people adopted [the home rule amendment] they conferred every power theretofore possessed by the legislature to authorize municipalities to function in local and municipal af-
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more compelling case for municipal immunity in Akron, the SuCircuit's
preme Court's decision to reverse and vacate the Sixth
14
decision in Akron was within the scope of Boulder. 6
The Supreme Court's reluctance to allow municipal governments to avoid the restrictions of the antitrust laws without scrutiny is understandable in light of the strong federal policies underlying the Sherman Act.147 On several occasions, the Court has
expressed its fear that local parochialism could prevent municipalities from giving proper consideration to outside concerns.1 48 The
Houston case, in which the court found that a conspiracy to limit

competition included the mayor and other city officials, certainly
demonstrates the susceptibility of an exclusive franchising procedure to political corruption and influence peddling.14 Nevertheless, the same sorts of pressures that could corrupt the legislative
process on the local level also can influence state legislatures. In
fact, because the vast majority of state legislators would have little
or no direct interest in municipal regulation of the type undertaken in Boulder, Akron, and Houston, important municipal issues
could become pawns in a legislative chess match of compromise

and negotiation.
Moreover, as the Boulder dissent noted, the denial of the
Parker exemption to home rule municipalities raises an important
question concerning the relationship between the federal and state
governments under American federalism. 5 0 In those lower federal
court decisions extending Parker immunity to home rule municifairs." Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
149 Colo. 284, 294, 369 P.2d 67, 72 (1962) (emphasis in original), quoted in Denver Urban
Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Colo. 1980). In City of Denver v. Sweet, 138
Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958), the supreme court acknowledged that it knew "of no state
with any broader provisions than ours," id. at 46, 329 P.2d at 444, but held that a municipality had no power to tax because the state constitution exclusively grants that right to the
General Assembly. Id. at 51-53, 320 P.2d at 446-47. The Colorado court also used language
that foreshadowed the district court opinion in Boulder I when it observed that "today
[home rule cities] think of themselves as being like medieval city-states with plenary powers
which bar the state from any form of supervision or control of matters which later events
show to be either matters of constitutional or state-wide concern." Id. at 47, 320 P.2d at 444.
The court's focus in Sweet, however, was the statewide concern/local interest dichotomy
that determines whether a municipality may exert its home rule authority in a given area.
See supra note 1.
146. 102 S. Ct. 1416 (1982), vacating and remanding 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981).
See supra note 95.
147. See supra note 10.
148. See supra notes 12 & 57 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 101.
150. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.

1982]

MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST IMMUNITY

1069

palities, 15 1 each court relied heavily upon the respective state
court's construction of the applicable home rule amendment.1 5
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the relevance of state court
holdings on the scope of Colorado home rule authority.1 5 3 The
Court's refusal to examine the judicial interpretation of the Colorado home rule amendment is particularly significant for Akron
because the Ohio Supreme Court previously had upheld the authority of a home rule city to institute a monopoly in garbage collection. Thus, unlike the Colorado decisions on home rule, Ohio's
1
case law explicitly authorizes the activity challenged in Akron. 5
Although the Supreme Court's position prevents the vicissitudes of
state municipal law from assuming a pivotal role in determining

the applicability of antitrust immunity, 5 5 the Court has foreclosed
any input by the state courts on an important state constitutional
question. Because little if any state legislative history exists from
the periods during which many of the states enacted home rule
provisions,156 state court decisions are often the only tools available

in determining a state legislature's intent. Although the Supreme
Court has disputed the relevance of National League of Cities v.
Usery 57 in Parker cases, the Court in Usery observed "that there
are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government
151. See supra notes 88-100 & 109-16 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 92-93 & 121 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
154. State ex rel. Moock v. City of Cincinnati, 120 Ohio St. 500, 508-09, 166 N.E. 583,
586, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 578 (1929); see supra note 93; see also Gardner v. Michigan, 199
U.S. 325 (1905) (City of Detroit has authority to grant exclusive 10-year privilege to provide
for disposal of garbage within city); California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works,
199 U.S. 306 (1905) (Board of Supervisors of San Francisco has authority to provide for
disposal of garbage within city and county for 50 years). The Supreme Court in California
Reduction Company cited the California constitutional home rule provision. Id. at 316 (citing CALIF. CONsT. art. X1, § 11). See Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 109 (1967)
("Save and unless the state, county, or municipal government runs afoul of a federally protected right, it has vast leeway in the management of its internal affairs."). A number of
Ohio court decisions indicate agreement with the traditional view in many states that matters affecting public health are state concerns. See State ex rel. Mowrer v. Underwood, 137
Ohio St. 1, _, 27 N.E.2d 773, 775-76 (1940) ("[T]he State did not surrender its sovereign
power to protect the public health of the state."); City of Bucyrus v. State Dep't of Health,
120 Ohio St. 426, 429-30, 166 N.E. 370, 370 (1929) (state may compel municipality to install
sewage treatment facilities). The motivation for the challenged action in Akron, however,
was apparently economic rather than health-related. See supra note 143 and accompanying
text.
155. See 1 C. ANTu, supra note 1, §§ 3.00-4.00.
156. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
157. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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which may not be impaired by Congress. ' 158 In matters that the
Constitution does not delegate expressly to the federal government, the states remain sovereign 159 and presumably may delegate
their authority as they wish within the limits imposed by their
state constitutions and the commerce clause.16 0 Furthermore, because many states adopted constitutional home rule amendments
by referendum,1 61 the reservation of authority to the people in the
tenth amendment16 2 may warrant greater deference for such provisions. By enacting a home rule amendment in this manner, the
people of a state have made a conscious decision concerning the
administration of that state's sovereignty.
158. Id. at 845. The Sixth Circuit has enumerated four factors that are important in
determining whether an activity is protected under the Usery analysis:
(1) the government service or activity benefits the community as a whole and is available to the public at little or no direct expense; (2) the service or activity is undertaken
for the purpose of public service rather than for pecuniary gain; (3) government is the
principal provider of the service or activity;, and (4) government is particularly suited
to provide the service or perform the activity because of a comnmunitywide need for the
service or activity.
Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979) (held that operation of
an airport is an "integral governmental function"); see also United Transp. Union v. Long
Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980) (held that state's operation of passenger rail service
is "integral governmental function" and not subject to Railway Labor Act), cert. granted,
452 U.S. 960 (1981); Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d 716
(5th Cir. 1979) (Texas oil and gas business held not to be "traditional governmental function"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979). But cf. Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist.,
557 F.2d 580, 589 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[Slubordinate units of government-notwithstanding
that they derive their powers from a state-are not entitled to all of the federalistic deference that the state would receive."), vacated, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1090 (1979).
159. U.S. CONsT. amend. X; see infra note 162.
160. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1978), the Supreme Court observed
that"[tlhe Commerce Clause has ... been interpreted by this Court not only as an authorization for congressional action but also, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute,
as a restriction on permissible state regulation." Id. at 326. The Court outlined the following
test to assess the validity of governmental actions under the commerce clause:
(1) [W]hether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce either on its
face or in practical effect; (2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and,
if so, (3) whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without
discriminating against interstate commerce.
Id. at 336; see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 727-29 (1981); Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
161. See supra note 1.
162. The tenth amendment provides as follows: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, not provided by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
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B. Determining the Validity of a Nonexempt Municipal Action
Notwithstanding these arguments, the Boulder decision demonstrates the Court's determination that the policies promoted by
the Sherman Act outweigh the local government's interest in regulating certain activities unless the state legislature specifically has

authorized the regulation. The question remains, however, whether
the Court will accommodate federalistic concerns once a party
challenges the municipal action under the antitrust laws. By limiting its decision to the availability of the Parkerdoctrine, the Boulder majority did not outline what standard courts should apply to
assess the validity of a nonexempt municipal restraint on trade imposed under home rule authority. Therefore, the Court may yet
develop a suitable rationale for upholding a nonexempt municipal
action under existing antitrust law that will accommodate municipal hardships such as those present in Akron. Although the Supreme Court has stressed the failure of Congress to provide an explicit state action exclusion in the Sherman Act,163 the Court
previously has recognized that the language of the Act is less inclusive than it may appear on its face.1 ' Thus, the Court probably
will subject municipally imposed restraints upon trade to the wellestablished rule of reason analysis. 15 This approach would enable
the federal courts to deal flexibly with municipal actions and avoid
163. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
164. The Supreme Court's adoption of the rule of reason in Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911), demonstrated a belief that a literal application of the § 1 prohibition of the Sherman Act was not consistent with the congressional
intent. The Court elaborated upon its decision in United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405
U.S. 596 (1972):
In lieu of the narrowest possible reading of § 1, the Court adopted a "rule of reason"
analysis for determining whether most business combinations or contracts violate the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act. [citation omitted] An analysis of the reasonableness
of particular restraints includes consideration of the facts peculiar to the business in
which the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its effects, and the history of the restraint and the reasons for its adoption. [citation omitted]
Id. at 606-07; see also Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) ("The long time
failure of Congress to alter the [Sherman] Act after it had been judicially construed, and the
enactment by Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction as
effective, is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the correct
one."). The Supreme Court, however, also broadened the Sherman Act by extending its coverage to insurance companies, despite the Court's earlier determination that insurance is not
interstate commerce. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944). After surveying the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the Court failed "to find
...
an expression of a clear and unequivocal desire of Congress to legislate only within that
area previously declared by this Court to be within the federal power." Id. at 556-57 (footnote omitted).
165. See supra note 164.
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the prospect of state court control of the enforcement of federal
antitrust laws through construction of state constitutions. Two
problems, however, may arise if the courts apply a rule of reason
analysis to challenged municipal actions. First, because many of
the anticompetitive measures that municipalities institute may fall

within the categories of restraints that are per se unreasonable
and, therefore, violative of the Sherman Act, 16 a rule of reason

standard could be of little or no assistance to home rule cities facing challenges to municipal actions. Second, and more importantly,
the Rehnquist dissent in Boulder observed that because the Court
treated the municipality as a private entity for purposes of the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court cannot sustain a restraint on trade

based solely upon the municipality's conclusion that unfettered
competition is against the public interest. 176 The Court's decision
in National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States1"
established the net impact of a restraint on trade on competition
as the only criterion for determining the regulation's reasonableness.169 Thus, the Court has foreclosed any inquiry under the rule
of reason analysis into possible arguments that a challenged ordinance promotes public interests other than competition. Nevertheless, the Court must develop an alternative rationale to enable municipalities-and ultimately, local taxpayers-to avoid the
financial burden of treble damages,170 because the threat of such
damages effectively may prevent financially strapped local governments from instituting necessary measures in response to local
concerns.171 The language of the antitrust laws provides no basis
166. Recognizing that a rule of reason analysis requires lengthy fact finding and subjective policy decision-making, the Supreme Court has determined,
[tihere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use.. . . Among the practices which the courts
have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing [citation
omitted]; division of markets [citation omitted]; group boycotts [citation omitted]; and
tying arrangements [citation omitted].
Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
167. See supra note 134.
168. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
169. Id. at 690-91; see supra note 134.
170. Several Justices have chastised the Court for its failure to confront the question
of a city's liability for treble damages. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
102 S. Ct. at 845 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light,
435 U.S. at 440-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171. See 102 S. Ct. at 845 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); supranote 75 and accompanying
text.
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for avoiding the treble damages remedy if a restraint on trade is
unreasonable. 17 2 Moreover, the Supreme Court's failure to address
the damages issue in Boulder is especially significant because damages are potentially much greater in larger home rule cities 17 3 with
complex local economies. This Recent Development surveys three
options that the Court might utilize to avoid the prospect of municipal liability for treble damages in many cases that lie outside
the scope of the Parker exemption. First, the Court could fashion
an exception to the traditional rule of reason analysis when a municipality is accused of an antitrust violation. Second, Chief Justice
Burger has proposed that the courts apply a "proprietary-governmental" distinction to determine when a municipality violates the
antitrust laws. Last, the preemption analysis advocated by Justice
Rehnquist might shelter a city from treble damages under the
Sherman Act.
To accommodate local interests threatened by a traditional
application of the antitrust laws, the Court could develop a reasonableness standard for municipalities that is distinct from the rule
of reason analysis articulated in ProfessionalEngineers and earlier
cases. Undoubtedly, municipalities seeking to regulate trade in the
public interest without specific legislative authorization would welcome the availability of an exception to Professional Engineers
whereby the Court would consider specialized local concerns. To
divorce this reasonableness standard from the traditional rule of
reason analysis, however, the Court must articulate clearly both
the relationship between municipal regulation and the antitrust
laws, and the interests that courts should evaluate in determining
the reasonableness of a municipally imposed restraint on trade.17 4
The Supreme Court in both Boulder and Lafayette has demonstrated a marked propensity to disagree on the relationship be172. Section four of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-fold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. IV 1980); see Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102
S. Ct. at 844-45 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
173. See supra note 17.
174. After the Supreme Court's decision in Lafayette, one commentator proposed a
three-part "governmental interest defense" for municipalities. Application of Antitrust
Laws, supra note 6, at 539-43. While the standard purports to accommodate local concerns
and federal antitrust policy, its reliance upon vague criteria undoubtedly would lead to uneven application by the courts.
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tween municipalities and the antitrust laws.1"
Notwithstanding the likelihood that the Court will rely upon
the traditional rule of reason analysis to determine when a municipality violates the Sherman Act, Chief Justice Burger's "proprietary-governmental" distinction in Lafayette7 6 arguably provides
one means of avoiding the vagueness and uncertainty inherent in
that analysis. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized previously the pitfalls that are also inherent in the use of the "proprietary-governmental" terminology.' 77 Furthermore, since the Court
demonstrated its desire to prevent state court control of the enforcement of the federal antitrust laws by its refusal to consider
state municipal law in Boulder, the Court is unlikely to adopt a
terminology that might force it to consider state tort decisions' 8 as
well as municipal law. The Chief Justice's failure in Lafayette to
define clearly "proprietary" and "governmental"'' is indicative of
the lack of clarity that pervades opinions that address these distinctions. Municipalities concerned about liability for treble damages would find that the vagueness of the terminology offers potential flexibility in considering the availability of the Parkerdoctrine,
but the outcome of an application of either the rule or reason or of
some new reasonableness standard to this nebulous distinction
would be difficult to predict. 80
175. See supra notes 48-79 & 109-36 and accompanying texts.
176. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
177. In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), the Supreme Court
referred to the "'non-governmental'-'governmental' quagmire that has long plagued the law
of municipal corporations." Id. at 65. The Court also noted that "the decisions in each of
the States are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try to apply a
rule of law that is inherently unsound." Id. But cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 368
(1934) ("[T]he immunity of the states from federal taxation is limited to those agencies
which are of a governmental character. Whenever a state engages in a business of a private
nature it exercises nongovernmental functions, and the business, though conducted by the
state, is not immune. ... "). Determining that a federal tax on mineral water applies to an
activity by the state of New York, the Supreme Court expressly rejected limitations on the
taxing power of Congress derived from "such untenable criteria as 'proprietary' against 'governmental' activities of the States, or historically sanctioned activities of Government, or
activities conducted merely for profit, and [found] no restriction upon Congress to include
the States in levying a tax enacted equally from private persons upon the same subject
matter." New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1945); see United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183 (1936).
178. Professor Prosser observed that the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions for purposes of tort liability is "confused and difficult" and "the subject
of. . .much disagreement." W. PROssaR, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 979 (4th ed.
1971).
179. See supra note 62.
180. See supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text.
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By addressing the question posed by the Boulder case as one
of preemption rather than exemption, Justice Rehnquist arguably
fashioned a rationale for avoiding the damages question altogether. ' Under his view, since the Sherman Act merely preempts
a municipally imposed restraint upon trade, the measure would be
unenforceable, but not violative of the Act.18 Because the precise
question presented in Boulder was moot,18 3 the Supreme Court
still may adopt the preemption analysis when faced with an active
violation of the antitrust laws. One critical question left unresolved
by Justice Rebnquist's dissent is to what extent, if any, a city
should be liable for damages incurred by the plaintiff in the interim between the regulation's enactment and the judicial declaration of its unenforceability. The resolution of this issue under a
preemption analysis requires examination of the federalism policies embodied in the Constitution.' Precluding the possibility of
treble damages would ease significantly the potential burden
placed upon home rule cities by the Boulder decision to seek specific legislative authorization for all economic regulations of questionable legality. Unless the Court adopts the preemption rationale, courts must choose either to impose damage liability if the
restraint on trade proves unreasonable or to distort the plain
meaning of the antitrust laws.
V.

CONCLUSION

In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Boulder, the threat
of treble damages imposes three potential burdens upon home rule
cities: (1) securing specific approval by the state legislature of any
regulatory measure with anticompetitive effect; (2) litigating antitrust challenges; and (3) incurring liability for treble damages. If
the Court, however, were to conclude that a municipality is not
liable for treble damages, city officials would not feel compelled to
seek specific legislative authorization for each instance of municipal economic regulation. Thus, by favorably resolving the damages
181. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 4.
183. The challenged action in Boulder !-the 90-day moratorium on expansion by petitioner-had expired by the time of the Supreme Court's decision. See supra note 110.
184. A discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this Recent Development. If
a preemption analysis is to have the effect Justice Rehnquist intended, however, the courts
must develop a suitable rationale to protect a municipality from liability for interim damages. Otherwise, the preemption analysis may not dispell adequately the deterrent effect of
treble damage liability. See Blumstein & Calvani, supra note 6, at 414-31 (discussing the
application of the tenth and eleventh amendments to state action).
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issue the Supreme Court may eliminate the potential burden of
treble damages and significantly lessen the number of instances in
which a municipality would request specific enabling legislation
from the state legislature. Furthermore, the unavailability of treble
damages also may reduce municipalities' expenses in defending antitrust claims by reducing the incentive for frivilous suits.
Despite the potential problems it poses for home rule municipalities, the Supreme Court's decision in Boulder has clarified the
Court's commitment to the position of the Lafayette plurality and
to a narrow construction of the Parker doctrine. The dispatch with
which the Court dismissed the federalism problem in Boulder-as
well as the important role stare decisis has played in another judicially created antitrust exemptionlW-indicates the unlikelihood
that the Court soon will reverse the trend of the recent cases on
the Parker doctrine.
The Court's adoption of the preemption rationale not only
could remove the treble damages problem, but it also could preserve the Court's well-established rule of reason analysis. Because
an unreasonable, municipally imposed restraint on trade would be
unenforceable under this rationale, the city's anticompetitive action would not impinge upon the important federal policies underlying the antitrust laws. Even though the use of a preemption rationale could deny monetary relief to individuals challenging the
city's action, absent a subsequent state legislative authorization,
the individuals would gain the equivalent of a permanent injunction since the unreasonable restraint would be unenforceable.
Should the Court fail to adopt the Boulder dissent's preemption
analysis in considering the damages question, home rules cities
may find a court's use of a separate reasonableness standard to determine whether a municipally imposed restraint on trade violates
the Sherman Act to be the only means for avoiding the debilitating
burden of treble damages.
DAvU JONATHAN WHITE

185. The Supreme Court has cited stare decisis as a prime factor in its decision to
continue the judicially created antitrust exemption for professional baseball. Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972) (following Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)).

